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UNWED FATHERS-Adoption-Foster Care Agency Seeking
Permission To Consent to Child's Adoption Need Not Always
Grant Child's Unwed Father Notice and Opportunity To Be
Heard. In re Kenneth M., 87 Misc. 2d 295, 383 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Fam-
ily Ct. 1976).
Petitioner foster-care agency, in compliance with New York So-
cial Services Law section 384(1)(d),' sought appointment as the
guardian of Kenneth M., a child born out-of-wedlock. The agency
also requested permission to consent to the child's adoption, pur-
suant to New York Domestic Relations Law section 111(4). Respon-
dent putative father of Kenneth received neither notice of the pend-
ing adoption proceeding nor an opportunity to be heard concerning
his child's best interests.' The basis of this denial was the respon-
dent's status as an unwed father.'
Kenneth had been born in June 1970. Two months later he was
placed with foster parents who subsequently wished to adopt him.'
Respondent had been incarcerated at the time of the child's birth
but, upon his release, he attempted to locate the child. In May 1973
respondent applied to the foster-care agency for visitation rights.7
Thereafter, the agency instituted the guardianship petition so that
it could consent to the desired adoption.
The family court granted the petition of the foster-care agency.'
Though respondent had claimed a violation of equal protection and
due process, the court found that a superior interest existed in pro-
tecting the adoption process.'
Historically, courts have considered the relationship between
children and their wed parents or unwed mothers as a fundamental
one. For example, in People ex rel. Portney v. Strasser,'0 the mater-
1. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(1)(d) (McKinney 1976) awards custody to an authorized
agency upon the signed, written surrender by the child's guardian: "if both parents of such
child are dead, or if such child is born out of wedlock and the mother of such child is
dead .. "
2. In re Kenneth M., 87 Misc. 2d 295, 383 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Family Ct. 1976). The agency
utilized N.Y. Soc. Serv. § 384(1)(d) since the natural mother had died in 1971. Id. at 1007.
3. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(4) (McKinney Supp. 1975) permits adoption with the
consent "of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the adoptive child."
4. 87 Misc. 2d at 300, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
5. Id.; N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(1)(d) (McKinney 1976).
6. 87 Misc. 2d at 298, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
7. Id., 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1007-08.
8. Id. at 302, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
9. Id. at 300-01, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1009-10.
.10. 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952).
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nal grandmother attempted to obtain custody of her daughter's le-
gitimate child, claiming that the natural mother was unfit. The
lower court found it in the child's best interest to approve the cus-
tody petition. The New York Court of Appeals reversed stating:"
No court can, for any but the gravest reasons, transfer a child from its natural
parent to any other person . . . since the right of a parent, under natural law,
to establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental one and beyond
the reach of any court ....
A year later the court of appeals reaffirmed the holding of Strasser
in a case involving an unwed mother. In People ex rel. Kropp v.
Shepsky,'2 plaintiff mother had given birth and immediately placed
the baby in an institution. One year later, she removed the child and
brought the infant with her to New York. While she worked or
looked for work, she boarded the child in various places. Finally,
being unemployed and indigent, she entrusted the child to a lawyer
who placed it with a family. A few days later the mother consented
to the child's adoption. Subsequently, the family court issued an
order of adoption but the natural mother instituted an action to
vacate this order.'3 The court, citing the above language'4 from
Strasser as determinative, vacated the adoption decree and re-
turned the child to her natural mother.' 5
Compared to wed parents and unwed mothers, unwed fathers had
virtually no rights regarding their children.'" New York was similar
to many jurisdictions in not requiring the unwed father's consent'7
11. Id. at 542, 104 N.E.2d at 896.
12. 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953).
13. Id. at 467, 113 N.E.2d at 803.
14. Id. at 468, 113 N.E.2d at 803.
15. Id. at 471, 113 N.E.2d at 805. In another case, Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk,
29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971), a child was born out-of-wedlock and
given to a foster-care agency which then placed the child with foster parents. During this time
the natural mother desired to maintain her relationship with the child. Two years passed and
the foster parents, desiring to adopt the child, refused to return it when the natural mother
rejected the proposed adoption. The court returned the child to its natural mother stating,
"Child and parent are entitled to be together, unless compelling reasons stemming from dire
circumstances or gross misconduct forbid it in the paramount interest of the child, or there
is abandonment or surrender by the parent." Id. at 199, 274 N.E.2d at 432-33, 324 N.Y.S.2d
at 939.
16. Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on
Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAMILY L. 231 (1971).
17. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(3) (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975);
see Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 436, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (2d Dep't 1971).
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and denying him notice of the pending adoption." In 1972, however,
the United States Supreme Court made significant changes in this
situation through its decision in Stanley v. Illinois."
Stanley involved an Illinois statute which created a presumption
that all unwed fathers were unfit to be awarded custody of their
children."' Petitioner father had lived with the natural mother for
eighteen years. During this time they sired and raised three chil-
dren. Upon the death of the mother, the child automatically became
a ward of the state. The father did not have the opportunity to
present evidence of his fitness to be awarded custody.2'
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the statute in 1970.22 Two
years later, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. 3 The
statute had created an irrebuttable presumption24 that all unwed
fathers were unsuitable to have custody of their children. The Court
found this unacceptable. 5 It stated that unwed fathers also pos-
sessed a "cognizable and substantial"2 interest in maintaining the
parent-child relationship. Though petitioner and most unwed fa-
thers could be neglectful parents, "all unmarried fathers are not in
this category." 7 Therefore, the Court held the denial of notice and
hearing a violation of due process."
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative
issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities
in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over
the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.
The Court concluded that all parents were entitled "to a hearing
on their fitness before their children are removed from their cus-
18. Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 436, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (2d Dep't 1971).
19. 405 U.S. 645 (1972), revg sub nom. In re Stanley, 45 111. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970).
20. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
21. 405 U.S. at 646.
22. In re Stanley, 45 I1. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970).
23. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
24. An irrebuttable presumption is one which is "definitely conclusive-incapable of
being overcome by proof of the most positive character." See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 96 (1965), citing Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 324 (1932); Note, The Irrebuttable
Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974).
25. 405 U.S. at 650.
26. Id. at 652.
27. Id. at 654.
28. Id. at 656-57.
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tody."' 2 Since only unwed fathers had been denied a hearing, the
Court summarily held that the statute also violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment."'
Stanley was a landmark decision, but the Court neglected to re-
solve at least three issues. It did not expressly determine whether
the relationship of unwed fathers to their children involved a funda-
mental right.' Secondly, the Court did not discuss the necessity of
the unwed father's consent to the proposed adoption. Finally, it
failed to consider the situations, if any, wherein notice and a best
interests hearing would not be required.
The first issue remained unresolved because the Court did not
explicitly label the interest involved as a fundamental one. How-
ever, it described the relationship between an unwed father and his
child in language tantamount to calling it fundamental.32 Moreover,
two basic principles are discernable from the Court's analysis.
These principles assist one in understanding when the fundamental
29. Id. at 658.
30. Id.
31. Traditional equal protection analysis utilizes one of two tests. A classification having
a legitimate state interest would be sustained if there were a rational basis for it. See McGo-
wan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
If the classification involved a suspect class or fundamental right, then it would be sub-
jected to the strict scrutiny test. It would be upheld only if it served a compelling state
interest and was the least restrictive means available for achieving that interest. See Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
In addition, there are various intermediate approaches which require more than a rational
basis but less than compelling reasons. Under these approaches, the court will balance the
state interest advanced against the right interfered with. These tests have been used when
classifications of sex and illegitimacy have been involved. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971)(sex). Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)(illegitimacy). The Supreme
Court has expressly declined to label illegitimacy a suspect classification. Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1974).
For a thorough discussion of the intermediate approaches, see Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
32. The Court labelled the interest as one which could not be abrogated "absent a
powerful countervailing interest," and one which was "cognizable and substantial." 405 U.S.
at 651-52.
Moreover, in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 (1975), the Court interpreted Stanley
as involving a fundamental right. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 47, 80 (1975). In Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 2761 n.8 (1976), the Court referred
to Stanley as a case involving familial relationships.
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interest is operative. First, the majority interpreted due process as
requiring an individualized determination;" whereas the Illinois
statute operated to give "procedure by presumption."34 This need
for individual determination led to the second principle. Suitability
should be determined according to the fitness of each individual
parent, rather than the parent's marital status. The proper ap-
proach would be to distinguish between caring and non-caring par-
ents, rather than between wed and unwed parents.35
The second and third issues left unanswered by the Court in
Stanley have been resolved differently in various states. In 1972, the
Supreme Court remanded two adoption cases to state courts in light
of its Stanley ruling."6 One state court thereafter required the unwed
father's consent to a proposed adoption;37 the other court awarded
an unwed father custody of his two sons.38 Similar results have not
been reached in every state. Various courts39 and legislatures'" have
divided over the question of requiring the father's consent, but
practically every court has required acknowledged unwed fathers to
receive notice and a hearing."
33. 405 U.S. at 655-57. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645 (1974);
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973)(Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
34. 405 U.S. at 656.
35. Id. With the emphasis upon the classification of caring/non-caring, distinctions made
according to gender would also seem to be invalid. This is particularly true in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions involving sex discrimination. However, sex has never been de-
clared a suspect classification. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(four justices
holding sex to be suspect).
36. Rothstein v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972); Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan,
405 U.S. 1051 (1972). Commentators have had no hesitation in applying Stanley to adoption
cases. E.g., Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (1972).
37. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 18-9, 207 N.W.2d 826, 830
(1973).
38. Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1972).
39. Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 1974)(consent required); State ex rel.
Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 59 Wis.2d 1, 8-9, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973)(consent required);
In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975)(consent not
required); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 215 Va. 49, 205 S.E.2d 644 (1974)(consent not required).
40. The states have about divided evenly over whether or not an unwed father's consent
is required. See Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois:
Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAMILY L. 115, Appendix I at 138 (1973) .
41. E.g., Catholic Charities of Arch. of Dubuque v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1975).
At least one court has required that notice and a hearing be given to all biological fathers. In
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In discussing the questions left unresolved by the Supreme Court,
the various courts have applied Stanley to custody and adoption
cases. Rather than taking a limited view of Stanley, they inter-
preted that decision as one involving the termination of parental
rights."
In In re Malpica-Orsini,"3 the New York Court of Appeals, for the
first time, considered the three issues left unsettled in Stanley.
Here, petitioner had cohabitated with the natural mother and their
child for approximately seventeen months. In September 1972 peti-
tioner admitted paternity and agreed to pay support. In 1973, the
mother married respondent who petitioned for adoption." Section
111(3) of the Domestic Relations Law' required for adoption pur-
poses, the consent of only the mother of a child born out-of-wedlock.
Nevertheless, the father received notice and an opportunity to be
heard at the direction of the court. Although the father objected to
the adoption, the court determined that the proposed adoption was
in the child's best interest."
The majority in Orsini affirmed the judgment of adoption and
held section 111(3) constitutional. As in Stanley, the court was ex-
tremely imprecise in defining the appropriate equal protection stan-
dard. The court labelled the reasons justifying the discrimination
against unwed fathers as "compelling,"47 indicating use of the strict
scrutiny test. However, the majority did not consider the second
element of that test, i.e., the requirement of utilizing the least re-
strictive means to protect the states' interests. A discussion of an
intermediate"5 standard of review49 terminated with the finding of
re Reyna, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138, 148, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 303-04 (5th Dist. 1976) (custody
proceeding). However, the general practice is to require acknowledgement of paternity as a
"threshold prerequisite." See, e.g., In re Fernando F., 83 Misc. 2d 421, 373 N.Y.S.2d 755
(Family Ct. 1975).
42. E.g., Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. App.
1975); Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1975).
43. 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
44. Id. at 569, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
45. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
46. 36 N.Y.2d at 569-70, 331 N.E.2d at 486-87, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 512-13.
47. Id. at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
48. See note 31 supra.
49. In particular, the court followed the test used in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972).
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compelling reasons. Ultimately, the court utilized the rational basis
test in holding that there was no denial of equal protection in requir-
ing the consent of wed fathers but not of unwed fathers.5'
Certainly, these facts demonstrate that the classification is reasonable, not
arbitrary, and, keeping in mind the paramount consideration of a child's
welfare, the legislative action is justified.
In formulating its equal protection analysis, the court in Orsini
refused to be bound by the "tired formulations" and "stock respon-
ses" of the two-tier approach to equal protection. Instead, it decided
the matter by "centering the review on the merits of the controversy
at hand and by conducting a realistic examination of the conflicting
policies and interests involved in the challenged statute ..... 1
The court believed that requiring the unwed father's consent would
have a detrimental effect on the adoption process. The result would
be to deny:5"
[Hiomes to the homeless and of depriving innocent children of the other
blessings of adoption. . . .At the very least, the worthy process of adoption
would be severely impeded.
Orsini followed Stanley by attempting to implement the car-
ing/non-caring classification. However, Orsini departed from
Stanley in not requiring family courts to utilize the individualized
approach in determining parental fitness. The court of appeals did
not discuss cases decided after Stanley wherein the Supreme Court
invalidated legislative classifications creating irrebuttable pre-
sumptions."' The court ignored the individualized approach man-
dated by the Supreme Court and justified its classification in light
of an overriding public concern.54
Orsini treated the due process issue summarily. The family court
had complied with the requirements of Stanley by giving the father
notice and affording him a hearing.55
Judge Jones dissented vigorously." While stating that utilization
50. 36 N.Y.2d at 574, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
51. Id. at 577-78, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
52. Id. at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
53. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
54. 36 N.Y.2d at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
55. Id., 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
56. Id. at 578, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
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of the intermediate equal protection test would invalidate the classi-
fication, 7 he maintained that the interest involved was fundamen-
tal and required "a higher level of constitutional protection.""6 In
support of this contention, Judge Jones cited the pre-1972 New York
cases of Spence-Chapin Adoption Service v. Polk"9 and People ex
rel. Kropp v. Shepsky" which recognized a fundamental interest in
the parent-child relationship. He found compelling state interests
to be involved in the instant case" and would have invalidated the
statute for not satisfying the second branch of the strict scrutiny
test." The requirement of utilizing the least restrictive means avail-
able to protect the state's compelling interests had not been met.
Therefore, it was not necessary, in the dissent's view, to deny a
hearing to all unmarried fathers. 3
A year after Orsini, Judge Nanette Dembitz noted, in In re Ken-
neth M.,14 that the Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal from
Orsini "for want of a substantial federal question."" ' She thereby
limited Stanley to custody cases and concluded that Stanley could
"no longer be deemed controlling in any adoption case. . "66 She
interpreted Orsini, as being determinative in New York and as up-
holding "the laws discriminating against unwed fathers as to all
adoptions of out-of-wedlock children." 7
The family court in Kenneth M. considered two issues. The first
was whether Orsini permitted or required the father's consent when
the mother dies without approving the proposed adoption." The
court found that Orsini had elevated "the public interest in the
adoption of out-of-wedlock children, as a class, over the claim of a
57. Id. at 582-83, 331 N.E.2d at 496, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
58. Id. at 583, 331 N.E.2d at 496, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
59. 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971).
60. 30.5 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953).
61. 36 N.Y.2d at 585, 331 N.E.2d at 498, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 586, 331 N.E.2d at 498-99, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 528-29.
64. 87 Misc. 2d 295, 296, 383 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1006 (1976).
65. 96 S. Ct. 765 (1976). That such a dismissal must be treated as a disposition on the
merits is substantiated by Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1975).
66. 87 Misc. 2d at 296, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1007. Judge Dembitz read Orsini as limiting
Stanley's equalization of the rights of wed and unwed fathers to custody proceedings when
the father had been living with his children. Id. at 301, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
67. Id. at 297-98, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
68. Id.
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right of veto by unwed fathers."'"5 The court found the factors which
justified the discrimination in Orsini' to be applicable in the in-
stant case." Here, the father of Kenneth had been incarcerated
when the child was born. If the adoption proceedings were sus-
pended until the putative father was located (in order to obtain his
consent), the child would have suffered the very detriments which
the Orsini court sought to prevent."
The second issue in Kenneth M. concerned whether a father, in
circumstances other than the father in Orsini, would be entitled to
notice and a best interests hearing. 3 In Orsini, the father lived with
the mother and their child for seventeen months. 4 The father of
Kenneth never lived with the child. If unwed biological fathers
would be entitled to a hearing at which they could prevail, adop-
tions would be discouraged and exposed to uncertainty and delay."
The court, therefore, held that notice and a hearing "should be
accorded only if there is substantial justification for so burdening
the adoption process."" The interest in Orsini was of an unwed
father in the child he had raised. Here, "the mere biological connec-
tion of the putative father with the child"" was insufficient to war-
rant a hearing. An alleged father should be entitled to a hearing only
when two prerequisites exist: (1) when he had acknowledged patern-
ity; and (2) when he lived with the child."
The court in Kenneth M. attempted to implement the car-
ing/non-caring classification. It desired to advance the best interests
of the child. However, as the court did in Orsini, Judge Dembitz
69. Id. at 299, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
70. 36 N.Y.2d at 572-74, 331 N.E.2d at 489-90, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17. Included among
the ten factors cited are: severely impeding the process of adoption; denying homes to the
homeless; and financial and administrative burdens. Id.
71. 87 Misc. 2d at 298, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 300, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1009. Judge Dembitz construed Orsini to hold that under
some circumstances a right to a hearing exists. Id. at 299-300, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
74. 36 N.Y.2d at 569, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513. In Stanley, the father lived
with the mother intermittently for eighteen years during which time they raised three chil-
dren. 405 U.S. at 646.
75. These are several of the factors referred to in Orsini as justifying the discrimination
against unwed fathers. 36 N.Y.2d at 572-74, 331 N.E.2d at 489-90, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17.
76. 87 Misc. 2d at 301, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1009.
77. Id.
78. Id., 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1009-10.
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neglected to pay due attention to Stanley's emphasis on the indivi-
dualized approach.
The holding of Orsini on the issue of consent became determina-
tive in Kenneth M. once Judge Dembitz accepted the premise
(without discussion) that the interest involved was not a fundamen-
tal one.7" The overriding factor in Orsini, justifying the exclusion of
unwed fathers, was the state interest in the adoption process. That
the natural mother was alive and had consented to the adoption in
Orsini, but had died without consenting to the adoption in Kenneth
M., was immaterial to the equal protection analysis. The prospec-
tive detriment to the adoption process occurs by giving the unwed
father the veto power. Therefore, the inability of the natural mother
to consent in the instant case did not alter the equal protection
result. The unwed father was not entitled to a veto power.
Kenneth M. did depart from Orsini, on equal protection grounds,
by not requiring notice and a hearing for unwed fathers. The court
in Orsini viewed the family court's grant of notice and a hearing as
complying with the constitutional mandate of Stanley.'" Judge
Dembitz, however, distinguished Stanley on the basis that the res-
pondent in the case at bar did not cohabitate with the natural
mother." In so doing, she apparently made an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that cohabitation is a necessary prerequisite for suitabil-
ity. This may be true of most unwed fathers who do not live with
the natural mother. However, to presume all such unwed fathers are
unsuitable repudiates the individual standard mandated by
Stanley2 and subsequent cases." Therefore, as in Stanley, a statute
which does not provide for notice and a hearing for any unwed father
cannot stand. There is not a rational basis for excluding all unwed
fathers.
On appeal, the appellate division should confront the fundamen-
tal interest issue. Guidelines must be established so that future
79. In In re Walker, 360 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1976), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invalida-
ted the distinction between unwed fathers and mothers as a denial of equal protection on the
basis of sex. Sex is considered a suspect classification in Pennsylvania due to that state's
equal rights amendment. Id. at 605-06.
80. 36 N.Y.2d at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
81. 87 Misc. 2d at 301, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 1009-10.
82. 405 U.S. at 657.
83. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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courts will be able to determine what parent-child relationships
involve a fundamental right. The possibilities range from the merely
biological relationship to substantial interaction between parent
and child.
Reviewing the approaches of various courts should be helpful in
clarifying when the interest is operative. Few courts recognize the
interest when it is based solely on biological parenthood." However,
when there has been a substantial relationship between an unwed
father and his child, as in Stanley, the interest is recognized. 5
Difficulty arises when the manifestation of interest by the unwed
father in his child amounts to little more than a biological relation-
ship. In order to assure that caring fathers, who have been able to
manifest only minimal interest, are not excluded from adoption
proceedings, the least manifestation of interest should suffice."
Most states require, at least, an acknowledgement of paternity. 7
Although a fundamental interest is present, this should not auto-
matically give the parent an arbitrary veto power. If a parent,
though genuinely interested in the child is unfit, granting him an
arbitrary veto would subvert the purposes of adoption laws and
infringe upon the child's basic rights.
For the purpose of consent, wed parents who have apparently
manifested their commitment through marriage might be presumed
to be caring parents and thereby given the veto power.8 Unwed
parents, on the other hand, could be presumed to be non-caring, and
thereby not entitled to the veto power. These presumptions would
be constitutionally valid if they were rebuttable."
For the purposes of a hearing, any parent who has met the mini-
mal requirements to establish a fundamental relationship should be
84. See In re K., 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976). Otherwise, the interest would have to apply
to sperm donors and rapists. Id. at 171.
85. 405 U.S. at 652.
86. This approach might be preferable to demanding stringent indications of interest
since concerned fathers might be by-passed due to uncontrollable circumstances. This was
the situation in Kenneth M.
87. 61 CORNELL L. REV. 312, 312-13 n.4 (1976).
88. See Catholic Charities v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539, 553 (Iowa 1975) (containing a short
but clear discussion of this point).
89. Rebuttable presumptions are numerous and constitutional. E.g., United States v.
,Johnson, 466 F.2d 537, 538 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1111 (1973)(inference of
participation in a crime, from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the
crime is committed).
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entitled to a hearing. Granting a hearing on these terms complies
with the individualized approach mandated by Stanley. Further-
more, granting such hearing is based on the assumption that only
those parents who have a genuine interest in the child will spend
the time and effort required to participate in the proceedings. Dur-
ing the adoption proceedings, the best possible result should occur
when all those persons making the determination are parties inti-
mately concerned about the child."'
Concern over delaying or impeding the adoption process acquires
significance when discussing the requirement of notice. As to fathers
whose paternity, existence, and whereabouts are unknown, notice
other than notice by certified mail would be permissible." For ex-
ample, states could provide notice by publication or require unac-
knowledged unwed fathers to inform themselves of the birth of
their children. In Stanley," the Court suggested the propriety of this
method of notice by stating that unwed fathers who do not promptly
respond to notice cannot later complain that their rights have been
violated. Moreover, laws requiring notice to all biological fathers,93
even those who are unknown, could prove to be unconstitutional."
The decision in Kenneth M. upholds legislation which deprives
many parents of basic fourteenth amendment guarantees. In so
doing, it also adversely affects the children it wishes to protect by
excluding from proceedings concerning their best interests those
parties who may have the most concern for them. Rather than fol-
lowing the lead of Stanley in furthering the fundamental interest
involved, Kenneth M. attempts to achieve the same result, distin-
guishing between caring and non-caring parents, but fails to utilize
the necessary prerequisite for achieving that result - the individual-
ized approach. Legislatures and courts, in their struggle to balance
90. This approach is similar to other instances where termination of parental rights is at
stake. See In re Sean B. W., 381 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (father who allegedly had
abandoned his child was entitled to a hearing); In re Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 366, 323
N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sur. Ct. 1971) (father incarcerated, notice and hearing required); In re
Ekstrom, 24 App. Div. 2d 276, 265 N.Y.S.2d 727 (3d Dep't 1965) (consent not required due
to father's divorce, but father still given notice and a hearing).
91. See Comment, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption
to the lUnknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 529-31 (1973).
92. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
93. See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.085 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.88
(Supp. 1975), amending § 48.88 (1957).
94. These statutes could prove to be unconstitutional if it were shown that such proce-
dures severely impeded the adoption process, thereby infringing upon the rights of the child.
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the competing interests of unwed parents and children born out-of-
wedlock, are encumbered by confusion as to the applicable standard
of review. Some of this confusion can be clarified by returning to the
individualized standard enunciated in Stanley.
Michael A. Vaccari

